9101034 OUYSOING Department of State AIRGRAM Classification NO. American Embassy, Bonn G-98 SENT TO: RPTD INFO: USBER BERLIN -G-23 American Embassy, Paris PARIS FOR USCINCTUR, THURSTON AND FINN References: A. CA-2391, September 12 B. Bonn's G-132, September 24 C. Berlin's G-73. September 26 Berlin Contingency Planning - Air Access - "Task One" British Embassy here has received comments from London on paper enclosed Ω CA-2391 and has suggested preliminary tripartite discussion here to be -followed by further review of technical aspects of problem by Three Embassies at Bonn. We gather British generally concur with paper but will wish to suggest different wording for some paragraphs. French have not yet commente Text of paper as revised will be forwarded immediately following tripartite discussion here. Meanwhile no objection Embassy's discussing present version. if questions asked by British or French Embassies at Bonn. Following are Department's comments on lettered paragraphs Embassy's a. Concur. b. Yes. concur. c. Statement would probably take form of note to Soviets with text released to public. In addition could be broadcast as Embassy suggests. d. Embassy's recommendation noted. Should be borne in mind provision of fixed altitudes for Soviet and East German flights is not essential part of contingency plan covered in rest of paper but is only course of action advisability of which would be considered (xxxxx at appropriate time. "Flig! not cleared through BASC" (which would then be functioning on tripartite basis) might be better term than "non-Allied flights." If this course followed, limitation should of course be placed on flights not cleared through Classification EUR: GPA: TDMcKirrnen: eaw Airgram transmission and BUR - Foy D. Kohler clussification approved by: L/EUR - Mr. Kearney ind/ GER - Mr. Hillenbrand W Defense - Col. Robinson GER - Mr. Vigderman 5/S-C: AV - Mr. Heahr 9011113-267 270

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through BASC. E.g. altitudes below 2500 feet and between 15 and 20 thousand feet might be released for use of flights not repeat not cleared through BASC with all other altitudes reserved for flights which have been cleared through BASC. Allied statement re release would be so phrased as to establish that full control of corridors retained by Allies and release could be modified or terminated by Allied action, if circumstances required, upon issuance appropriety timed notice.

Following are Department's comments on Berlin's G-73 (paragraph numbers refer to G-73 not CA-2391):

lst paragraph: These words included in statement because it obvious factors on which safety of flight depends include a number over which Soviets have no control. Word "avoiding" should be omitted in any case.

2nd paragraph: Concur.

3rd and 6th paragraphs: Noted.

4th paragraph: We do not believe BASC's acceptance flight plan for East German aircraft confers any rights on East Germans. On contrary, this procedure would appear to us to confirm Allied rights. We naturally unable anticipate whether East German traffic would be heavy enough for acceptance of flight plans on first-comefirst-served basis to creete practical difficulties but if such difficulties arose believe BASC could offer alternative altitudes, including higher altitudes not habitually used by Allied aircraft. If East Germans willing to cooperate to extent of filing flight plan (and this is big if), we see no reason why practical problems of altitude allocation could not be worked out. In addition we could, as occasion warrants, publicly announce that acceptance such flight plans does not confer any right to use of corridors. JCS/AF urges addition of sentence at end of fourth paragraph Berlin's G-73 along following lines: "All flight plans originating from East Germans will be handled on a case by case basis at highest command level rather than at operational level." East German aircraft would have relatively little need to fly in corridors. AF considers it necessary to control movements closely. Points out these restrictions no more severe than those imposed on USAF planes by some of our NATO allies.

5th paragraph: We find Mission's argument persuasive. Note comments on paragraph d) Embassy's G-132.

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